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THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTITRUST ACT­
A GUIDE FOR THE PRIVATE PRACTITIONER 
LOIS M. WOOCHER* 

PAUL A. MANOFF** 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Business in the 1980's faces increased market pressures, con­
tinued conglomerate growth, and intensified government regula­
tion. All presage increased utilization of the federal and state anti­
trust laws to challenge anticompetitive business behavior. To meet 
this need, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts recently enacted 
the Massachusetts Antitrust Act, incorporated in the statutes as 
chapter 93. 1 Patterned after the federal Sherman and Clayton 
Acts,2 this statute substantially modernizes the Commonwealth's 
antitrust law by creating new substantive rights, procedural de­
vices, and harsh penalties for improper business activities. To en­
courage private enforcement, it awards successful claimants up to 
three times their actual damages, equitable relief, costs, and rea­
sonable attorneys' fees. 
The general practitioner, whether representing the large cor­
poration or the sole proprietor, will increasingly be required to 
counsel clients on the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. Such coun­
seling would be incomplete without an awareness of the rights and 
proscriptions set forth in chapter 93 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. 
This paper introduces chapter 93 to the Massachusetts prac­
titioner unfamiliar with this specialized legal field. Included will 
be a review of the Act's legislative history, a summary of each pro­
vision, a discussion of potential procedural and substantive difficul­
* Legal Staff Attorney, J.C. Penney Company, New York, N.Y. Formerly with the 
law firm of Brown, Prifti, Leighton and Cohen, Boston, Mass. J.D., Columbia Uni­
versity, 1971. 
** Private Practitioner, Boston, Mass.; J.D., University of California at Los An­
geles, 1973. 
The authors Wish to thank Harold Brown, senior partner in Brown, Prifti, 
Leighton and Cohen, for his valued assistance in preparing this article. 
1. 1978 Mass. Acts, ch. 459; approved July 17, 1978; Emergency declaration 
filed August 10, 1978, effective August 17, 1978 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 93, §§ 1-14A (West Cum. Supp. 1980)). 
2. See notes 10-24 infra. 
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ties, and proposals for statutory reform. Applying the adage that 
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, counsel may well 
benefit from advance study of this new and far-reaching act. 
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
A. Resurgence of State Antitrust Activities 
The passage of a remodeled antitrust act coincided with the 
revitalization of state antitrust activity. Since 1970 alone, well over 
thirty states have enacted comprehensive antitrust legislation. 3 This 
renaissance was encouraged by four concurrent events: (1) Growing 
public awareness that the federal government could not adequately 
police local and regional anticompetitive behavior;4 (2) congres­
sional authorization for state attorneys general to bring antitrust ac­
tions in the federal courts, thereby increasing their involvement 
and interest in antitrust regulation;5 (3) the availability of federal 
"seed money" for the development of state antitrust divisions;6 and 
(4) state participation in several successful multi-party antitrust ac­
tions which resulted in large financial recoveries. 7 These led to in­
creased political and public support for a continuation of the state's 
role as antitrust prosecutor. 
3. Such state laws are compiled in [1972] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,000 
at 35,011. 
4. Together, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Bureau 
of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) employ fewer than 1,000 at­
torneys. These agencies have conceded that they can handle only a fraction of the 
country's antitrust matters. See Schellhardt, Merger oj Antitrust Division, FTC Unit 
Is Ordered jor Study, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1977, at 4, col. 2. Their inadequate staff 
and resources are further diminished by the inability of the federal statutes to reach 
many local and state anticompetitive practices. 
5. Hart-Scotl-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311­
1314 (1976) & 18 U.S.C. 1505 (1976). See Fein, Constitutional Issues Raised by the 
Parens Patriae Title oj the Antitrust Improvements Act oj 1976:-An Appraisal, 47 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1205 (1979); Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improve­
ments Act oj 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1977). 
6. The Crime Control Act of 1976 § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976) authorizes the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to award grants totalling up to $10 mil­
lion per year for three years as "seed money." Pursuant to this program, 
Massachusetts has received grants of over $300,000 per year. Congress recently au­
thorized an additional $4 million "seed money" appropriation which was not origi­
nally sought by the Justice Department. See 943 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA), at D-3 (Dec. 13, 1979). 
7. An example is the Tetracycline litigation, West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & 
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ajI'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 871 (1971). Economists estimate that direct costs for all types of antitrust vi­
olations amount to well over $40 billion per year. See 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REp. (BNA) Supp. 1, at 7 (Dec. 7, 1978). 
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State antitrust involvement has historical antecedents. Con­
trary to popular belief, the states preceded the federal government 
in antitrust enforcement. 8 Before the enactment of federal legisla­
tion, more than twenty states had statutes proscribing "restraints of 
trade." Near the close of the nineteenth century, several states ini­
tiated legal actions against the corporate "trusts" then dominating 
the business landscape. 9 Despite these efforts, however, the power 
of the robber barons expanded, intensifying public antagonism to 
their unscrupulous practices. This swelling of public sentiment led 
to congressional enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the first 
federal antitrust law. 10 Although intended merely to supplement 
existing state antitrust efforts,l1 the Act virtually resulted in federal 
preemption. 12 By the start of World War I, the states had ceased 
their antitrust activities, allowing the federal regulators to prose­
8. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 155 (1955). By the time the federal Sherman Act was passed 
in 1890, 15 other states including Massachusetts had constitutional provisions pro­
tecting trade while others had adopted common law prohibitions of monopolies and 
trade restraints. See 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Supp. 1, at 12 (Dec. 
7, 1978). 
9. H. THORELLI, supra note 8, at 259-66. 
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1-7 (1976)). 
11. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Sherman, described its purpose as "to sup­
plement the enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law 
by the courts of the several states.... It is to arm the Federal courts ... that they 
may cooperate with the state courts ...." 21 CONGo REC. 2457 (1890). The House 
Judiciary Committee report on the bill further noted, "Whatever legislation Congress 
may enact on this subject ... will prove of little value unless the states shall supple­
ment it by auxiliary and proper legislation...." H.R. REP. No. 1705, 51st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1890). 
12. Federal preemption of the antitrust field is a common defense in state ac­
tions. Preemption applies when Congress enacts federal legislation which expressly 
or by implication entirely displaces the substantive state law relied on by the claim­
ant. 
In the antitrust area, Congress has neither expressed this intent, James v. Rath 
Packing Co.; 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), nor implied it, Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. 
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 155 (1942). See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 
U.S. 117, 131-33 (1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1978), cen. 
denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979). 
As the United States District Court for Connecticut recently noted: "Even state 
law that prohibits more than federal antitrust statutes is not necessarily in conflict 
with, and preempted by, federal law, since the toleration of certain conduct by fed­
eral law does not imply an affirmative policy in favor of that conduct." State v. Levi 
Strauss & Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Conn. 1979) (citing 1 P. AREEDA & D. 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 208, at 58-59 (1978)). See Commonwealth v. McHugh, 
326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950). But see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & 
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), in which federal labor law was held to 
preempt state, but not federal antitrust law. 
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cute. 13 Not until half a century later did they resume their role as 
antitrust protagonist. 
B. The Drafting Process of the Massachusetts Antitrust Act 
Prior Massachusetts antitrust law14 had three major weak­
nesses; it was substantively inadequate, procedurally cumbersome, 
and difficult to interpret. 15 Judicial construction amplified these 
shortcomings. A prime example can be found in the holding by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the original statute ap­
plied only to commodities and not to services or to intangible prop­
erty,16 Accordingly, statutory reform was needed to counteract ju­
dicial retrenchment and to protect the unwary public. 
The Massachusetts Antitrust Act is a compromise bill reflect­
ing contributions by the attorney general,17 the business commu­
nity, and consumer groups. The draftsmen were guided by the fed­
eral antitrust statutes,18 the model Uniform State Antitrust Act, 19 
and recently enacted state antitrust laws. 20 While they recognized 
13. It is unclear why state efforts ceased at this time. One theory is that legisla­
tures failed to appropriate funds for antitrust enforcement to encourage industries to 
locate in their states. See generally Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 697-98 (1974). 
14. The former chapter 93 of the Massachusetts General Laws consisted of nu­
merous piecemeal sections which had been enacted in sporadic fashion between 
1901 and 1912. 
15. For example, former chapter 93, § 2, proscribed monopolistic practices in 
14 lines, whereas the present act requires only three. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 93, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
16. SDK Medical Computer Servs. Corp. v. Professional Operating Manage­
ment Group, Inc., 371 Mass. 117, 354 N.E.2d 852 (1976). The Supreme Judicial 
Court's restrictive attitude is further apparent in North Station Wine Co. v. United 
Liquors, Ltd., 323 Mass. 48, 80 N.E.2d 1 (1948). Plaintiff's claim that defendant was 
engaged in an illegal tying scheme was found immaterial. Id. 
17. The Attorney General had been trying to obtain enactment of a new anti­
trust act since 1974. Failure to do so may have been attributable to the vigorous en­
forcement provisions of the proposed drafts. 
18. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
12-27, as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). 
19. Uniform State Antitrust Act, approved in 1973 by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the ABA House of Delegates, re­
printed in [1974] 4 TRADE REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 30,101 at 35,151. The model act has 
not gained wide acceptance. 
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 35-24 to -45 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 356:1-14 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
56:9-1 to :9-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Michie Cum. 
Supp. 1979). These state laws exhibit little uniformity. While varying substantially, 
they generally follow three patterns: (1) Employ broad langauge patterned on the 
Sherman Act; (2) more specifically proscribe "trusts and combinations," which seek 
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that a remodeled antitrust act would probably be enacted, there 
was little consensus on specific provisions. The senate's draft ap­
peared to favor big business. The public interest lobby regarded it 
as weak, inadequate, and even dangerous since it imposed serious 
restrictions on the right to recover damages under chapter 93A for 
"unfair methods of competition. "21 In return for eliminating these 
restrictions, they agreed to accept the draft's severely deficient ju­
risdictional and exemption sections. Based on this compromise, the 
revised bill received the strong support of legislative leaders, sail­
ing through with little discussion22 before being speedily approved 
by the Governor.23 
III. THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 93 
A. 	 Section 1: Title; Purpose; and Construction 
Section 1 declares that chapter 93 is to be known as the Mass­
achusetts Antitrust Act. 24 Its purpose is "to encourage free and 
open competition in the interests of the general welfare and econ­
omy by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and monopo­
listic practices in the commonwealth." Significantly, the Act "shall 
be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of comparable 
federal antitrust statutes insofar as practicable."25 While this lan­
to fix prices, monopolize, or limit the quantity of goods; or (3) very specifically enu­
merate a list of prohibited practices. 
21. Pursuant to chapter 93A, § 11, a businessperson may sue for "unfair meth­
ods of competition," which is the same standard as in § 5 of the Federal Trade Com­
mission Act, IS U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Section 5(a) has been held to reach incipient as 
well as actual antitrust violations. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); 
note 98 infra. 
22. State Senator Jack Backman introduced several amendments to strengthen 
the legislation. On the basis of the compromises by public and private interests, they 
were withdrawn without formal vote. The legislative history reflects no other 
discussion of the bill. As is frequently the case in Massachusetts, this vacuum es­
chews guidance for the intended meaning of particular provisions. The reactions of 
the consumer and business groups to the Senate bill were expressed in several let­
ters to the state's weekly legal publication. See Ravech, Proposed Mass. Antitrust 
Act Creates Problems, 6 MASS. LAw. WEEKLY 749, at 9 (June 5, 1978); Goldberg, A 
Differing View of the Mass. Antitrust Act, 6 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 829, at 5 (June 26, 
1978); Ravech, Goldberg Letter is Not the Answer to Problems of Mass. Antitrust, 6 
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 849 at 5 (July 3, 1978). 
23. The compromise drafting process may explain chapter 93's frequent ambi­
guity. As with the federal statutes, clarification appears to have been intentionally 
left to the courts. 
24. 	 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § I (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
25. Id. (emphasis added). Generally, the federal antitrust statutes are regarded 
as the Sherman and Clayton Acts, (Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); 
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guage strictly limits judicial discretion, it also provides the Act with 
a ready-made history by reference to the voluminous body of fed­
eral antitrust case law. This corresponds to chapter 93A's guidance 
from federal decisions interpreting the substantive provision of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. Since chapter 93A specifies 
that Massachusetts courts are only to be guided by federal prece­
dents, allowance is available for interpretive differences which con­
sider the Commonwealth's unique perspective. 
The legislative history of chapter 93 reflects the different con­
struction standards of these two sister statutes. The senate draft of 
chapter 93 sought to conform chapter 93A to chapter 93's "in har­
mony" standard and to shift chapter 93A's basis from the FTC Act 
to the federal antitrust laws. As the latter are not so sweeping, this 
proposal would have seriously narrowed chapter 93A's reach. Since 
business conduct may be subject to review under both statutes, 
proponents contended that different and potentially inconsistent 
standards of legality should not be applied. Opponents countered 
that amending chapter 93A was unnecessary, contrary to the analo­
gous federal scheme, and would seriously weaken the Act by nar­
rowing its reach. In its final version, chapter 93 did not curtail the 
scope of chapter 93A. 
B. Section 2: Definitions 
The definitions adopted in section 2 generally reflect the com­
promise origins of chapter 93. For example, the term "trade or 
commerce," while including advertising and leasing, specifically ex­
cludes the conveyance, transfer, or use of real property.26 Clearly 
Clayton Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976)), but not the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc., [1976-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 
~ 60,973 at 69,301 (D.D.C.). A recent case illustrating the scope of the "in hannony" 
standard is State v. Lawn King, Inc., 169 N.J. Super. 346,404 A.2d 1215 (App. Div. 
1979), aff'd, 978 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at F-l (Aug. 21, 1980). In 
this case, New Jersey's first criminal convictions under its remodeled antitrust statute 
were reversed. The basis for this reversal was that the trial court had not acted "in 
harmony" with federal law. In reviewing the vertical price fixing and tying claims, 
the court applied a per se standard instead of the "rule of reason." Interestingly, at 
the time of the lower court's ruling, the federal courts also used the per se test. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, noting that it was proceeding with the 
"greatest caution" because of the criminal nature of the case. [d. 
26. The banks' lobbying efforts may have been encouraged by the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court's failure to resolve the issue of chapter 93A's application to banks. See 
Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Killein, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 384 N.E.2d 
1231, 1237 (1979). However, since insurance companies, Dodd v. Commercial Union 
Ins. Co., 373 Mass. 72 (1977), 365 N.E.2d 802 (1977), and public utilities, Lowell Gas 
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differing from both the statutory and judicial application of chapter 
93A,27 this limitation may be explained by intense lobbying from 
the banking community. 
C. Section 3: Jurisdiction 
Section 3 establishes the Act's jurisdictional28 reach, em­
phasizing its "regional" nature. The Act applies· only to activities 
that impact primarily within the Commonwealth. Procedurally, if a 
defendant establishes that it derives more than ten percent of its 
gross revenues from interstate commerce outside New England, 
the burden of establishing jurisdiction shifts to the complaining 
party. 
Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 385 N.E.2d 240 (1979), have 
been held to be subject to chapter 93A, banks may also lie within the jurisdiction of 
chapter 93A. 
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); Heller v. 
Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2850, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978); Com­
monwealth v. De Cotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748 (1974). 
28. Our federalist system can be seen as distributing jurisdiction along a con­
tinuum, with the states and federal government comprising the two opposite ends. 
Determinations of placement on this spectrum are subject to the constitutional prin­
ciples embodied in the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the Supremacy 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, and the fourteenth amendment's procedural due pro­
cess requirements (e.g., minimum contacts must exist between the forum state and the 
defendant for the purposes of in personam jurisdiction. See International Shoe v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). This continuum can be divided into three head­
ings: (1) Exclusive state jurisdiction, (2) exclusive federal jurisdiction, and (3) concur­
rent federal/state jurisdiction. The first applies to wholly intrastate activities and 
rests on the states' general police authority to regulate wholly local commerce. See 
National Cotton Oil Co. v~ Texas, 197 U.S. U5 (1905). The second correspondingly 
applies to wholly interstate activities. The limits of both have been considerably nar­
rowed by the judiciary's expanded definition of interstate and intrastate commerce. 
Consequently, the third heading comprising the middle range has been increasingly 
broadened. State jurisdiction now reaches interstate restraints with "significant local 
consequences" or a "local nexus." See Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforce­
ment, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 676 (1974); 892 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA), Supp. 1, at U (Dec. 7, 1978). Federal jurisdiction reaches basically intrastate 
restraints which "substantially affect interstate commerce." McLain v. Real Estate 
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 502, 509 (1980). 
State jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices therefore is subject to the fol­
lowing three limitations: (1) Significant local nexus; (2) no unreasonable burden on 
or discrimination against interstate commerce; and (3) no conflict with affirmative 
federal policy. Federal jurisdiction in turn covers activities which (1) occur within 
the flow of interstate commerce, or (2) substantially affect interstate commerce. 
Clearly there is a substantial area of overlap wherein both federal and state agencies 
are empowered to act. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), afrdon 
other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum 
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). 
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The statute thus focuses on two separate and conjunctive 
standards, the geographic location where the act occurred and its 
primary area of impact. Numerous questions are raised as to the 
construction and scope of these two tests. For example, the term 
"occur" is subject to several interpretations. If two competitors 
fixed prices of a commodity in California, with the commodity be­
ing manufactured in Wisconsin and sold in Massachusetts, did the 
illegal act occur in California, Wisconsin, or Massachusetts? More­
over, if it occurred in Massachusetts, must claimant also establish 
that sales occurred "primarily and predominantly"29 within the Com­
monwealth by showing that more than fifty percent of claimant's 
business derived from Massachusetts? Similar issues also arise con­
cerning the meaning of "competitive impact." Perhaps these words 
can be construed as requiring only a showing of a "substantial ef­
fect on intrastate commerce." This ambiguity, however, not only pro­
vides little guidance for the prospective litigant, but invites defensive 
delaying tactics pending more definitive judicial construction. 
The "commerce" requirement is expected to raise substantial 
evidentiary difficulties for victims. Much time and effort might be 
expended in establishing the corollary elements of jurisdiction. As 
a result, claimants may find themselves embroiled in economic bat­
tles over the delineation of an activity's primary impact area30 
rather than in litigating the merits of the action. 
If a claimant successfully overcomes the commerce impedi­
ment, the jurisdictional prerequisites still remain. This constitutes 
a negative hurdle, namely to establish that the challenged conduct 
has not been the subject of a formal investigation, proceeding or 
other assertion of federal jurisdiction by the FTC, the United States 
Department of Justice, or other federal agency. 
This provision may immunize anticompetitive conduct re­
viewed summarily by a federal agency. This federal preemption ap­
29. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93, § 3 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
30. Section 3 is crucial to the Act's effectiveness. Yet, in addition to being am­
biguous, it appears unnecessarily weak. Somewhat broader is chapter 93A, § 3, which 
exempts defendants who derive at least 20% of their gross revenue from transactions 
in interstate commerce except if the challenged transactions "occur primarily and 
substantially within the Commonwealth." An allegation that at least one such act has 
occurred in Massachusetts may satisfy chapter 93A jurisdiction over a large national 
company. In re Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 353, 362 N.E.2d 207 (1977). It is un­
likely that a claimant can Similarly satisfy the additional jurisdictional test of chapter 
93 as to "local" impact. 
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pears unnecessarily broad. It may, for example, embrace patently 
offensive practices peremptorily investigated by a federal agency 
which then elected not to pursue the matter for any number of 
nonsubstantive reasons. These might include the reasoning that the 
perpetrating company was engaged primarily in intrastate, re­
gional, or nationally insubstantial commerce; the agency's limited 
resources are to be focused on other types of restraints or relation­
ships, for example, ones which are horizontal as opposed to verti­
cal;31 or that the agency lacked the necessary remedial authority 
and therefore chose to defer to other regulators. 
Considerable redrafting of section 3 might well be warranted 
to eliminate the overly restrictive jurisdictional barriers. Instead of 
attempting to exclude conduct in interstate commerce, the Com­
monwealth should extend its jurisdiction to constitutional limits. 32 
This would better achieve the Act's goal of encouraging and pro­
tecting fair and unfettered competition. Litigation thus would be 
freed from unnecessary restrictions, fostering those local cases 
which have been substantially ignored in federal enforcement by 
the Antitrust Division and the FTC.33 
D. Sections 4, 5, and 6: The Substantive Provisions 
The substantive heart of the statute lies in sections 4, 5, and 
6, which parallel the federal antitrust laws. Echoing section 1 of 
the Sherman Act,34 section 4 declares: "Every contract, combina­
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce in the commonwealth shall be unlawful." Viola­
tions would occur where two or more separate entities agree to fix 
31. Reportedly, several years ago the Justice Department made a policy deci­
sion to shift its antitrust efforts from vertical to horizontal conduct. However, the 
new head of the Antitrust Division, Sanford Litvack, recently stated that the Justice 
Department will give a new emphasis to vertical cases. The FTC which has been fo­
cusing on horizontal arrangements, may likewise be shifting its emphasis. 955 ANTI­
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-2 (Mar. 13, 1980). 
32. In passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended "to go to the utmost extent 
of its constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements." United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriter Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). See also Exxon 
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 
310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
33. Other states have not adopted a restrictive approach to the coverage of their 
antitrust laws. Some have extended jurisdiction to the limits of long-arm statutes and 
the fourteenth amendment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-24 to -45 (West Cum. 
Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.801-28 (West Cum. Supp. 1980) and N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 356:1-14 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
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prices35 at the horizontal36 or vertical level,37 to divide the market 
between competitors,38 to boycott competitors,39 to tie the sale of 
a desired item with the purchase of another less desired item,40to 
restrain a distributor's territory, 41 or to otherwise unreasonably re­
strain trade. 42 
Modeled on section 2 of the Sherman Act,43 section 5 states: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other per­
son or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce in the 
commonwealth." Without requiring a combination of two or more 
persons, it prohibits unitary conduct by a firm acting alone which 
results in its obtaining monopoly power, that is, power to control 
prices or to exclude competition,44 or raises the dangerous proba­
bility that it will achieve such power. 45 
35. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Morrison v.Nissan Mo­
tor Co., 601 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1979). 
36. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Na­
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
37. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Eastern Scientific Co. 
v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
833 (1978). 
38. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), 
modified and afI'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Engine Specialities, Inc. v. Bombardier, 
Ltd., 605 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979). 
39. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); Klor's Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. 
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Cernuto v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 
1979); Erewhon, Inc. v. Northeast Health Food Merchants, 428 F. Supp. 551 (D. 
Mass. 1977). But see Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). 
40. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner II), 429 
U.S. 610 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Anderson 
Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 973 (D. 
Mass. 1979). 
41. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); United 
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
42. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1979); 
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 
44. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States 
v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. I (1911); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979). 
45. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Agrashell, Inc. v. Ham­
mons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1973). 
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Section 6, based on section 3 of the Clayton Act,46 forbids ex­
clusive supply and similar arrangements. In "tying" arrangements, 
prohibited by this section and by section 4 of the Massachusetts 
Act, a seller illegally conditions the sale of one product, the tying 
product, on the buyer's purchase of a second product, the tied 
product. 47 An exclusive dealing arrangement involves an unreason­
able commitment by a buyer to deal with one specific seller to the 
detriment of competing sellers.48 Section 6 differs from the general 
proscriptions of section 4 in two ways: it applies only to the sale or 
lease of tangible commodities; and it prohibits acts whose effect 
may be either to substantially lessen competition or to tend to cre­
ate a monopoly. Section 3 of the Clayton Act was intended to ar­
rest in its incipiency conduct which in time might develop into a 
violation of section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act. 49 The same 
distinction underlies the state provision. 
This discussion of sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Massachusetts Act 
merely touches on the scope and meaning of these sections. There 
are almost one hundred years of interpretive federal court deci­
sions construing the simple statutory language of the federal anti­
trust laws. 50 To understand the substantive heart of chapter 93, 
practitioners must familiarize themselves with the large body of 
federal antitrust case law. 51 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). 
47. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-609 
(1953). 
48. Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196 (7th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 100 S. Ct. 231 (1979); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 
(1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
49. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). Professor Sullivan of the Uni­
versity of California Law School suggests the courts have apparently reduced the 
Sherman threshold to the Clayton level, and therefore there is no meaning to this 
fine distinction. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 440 (1977). 
50. Antitrust source materials include: Commerce Clearing House (CCH) Trade 
Regulation Reporter, a five-volume looseleaf service for the antitrust field; ABA, 
Antitrust Law Developments with second supplement (1st ed. 1975), a one-volume 
summary; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 49, a hornbook; Bureau of National Affairs 
(BNA), Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reports, (ATRR), a wp.ekly newsletter on cur­
rent developments in the antitrust and trade regulation area; J. VON KALINOWSKI, 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION (Matthew Bender, 
1980), a IS-volume treatise, and P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978) a 
three-volume treatise. 
51. The federal antitrust laws do not always mean what they appear to say. For 
example, in referring to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, Prof. Sullivan notes 
that: "[N]either has been read literally. The scope of each of these provisions has 
been narrowed through standing requirements invented and elaborated upon by the 
courts." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 49, at 770. For example, the Sherman Act's refer­
22 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:11 
E. Section 7: Exemptions 
Section 7 exempts three broad categories of conduct. Conduct 
is not included if: (1) Exempt from the federal antitrust statutes52 
or the FTC Act;53 (2) subject to federal or state regulation or su­
pervision; or (3) authorized or approved by federal, state, or local 
law. 54 If applied literally, this section would threaten to eviscerate 
ence in § 1 to "Every contract, combination . . ." has been defined to mean 
only contracts or combinations which unnreasonably restrain competition. Northern 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). In addition, the Clayton Act's remedy provision has 
confined standing to persons sustaining "antitrust" injuries, that is, injuries of the 
kind the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl­
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). Certain unique principles have also been judicially 
created, the most significant being the per se and "rule of reason" tests. The former 
holds that conduct can be found illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the harm it 
has caused or the business excuse for its use, if it is so pernicious in its effect on 
competition as to have no redeeming virtue. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Examples of per se illegal conduct include horizontal price fixing, 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); vertical price fixing, 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); market allocation, United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 
211 (1899); certain types of tying arrangements, Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); 
and group boycotts, Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). In 
contrast, the "rule of reason" requires an elaborate inquiry into anticompetitive ef­
fects. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1, 59-60 (1911); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In summary, 
while antitrust law incorporates many common law principles, it also has developed 
its own unique doctrines. Many of these doctrines may be adopted by the Massa­
chusetts judiciary. 
52. The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 
(1976), exempts the "business of insurance" from the antitrust laws. See Group Life 
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Recent conflicting circuit 
decisions indicate that the construction of this limited exemption is not uniform. Lib­
erty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1979); Bartholomew v. 
Virginia Chiropractors Ass'n, 612 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1979). 
53. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); Capper-Volstead Agricultural Pro­
ducers' Associations Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1976). See National Broiler Mktg. 
Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978); Maryland & Virginia Milk Prod. Ass'n v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). Congress is considering exempting agricultural 
cooperatives from the FTC Act. This apparently would doom several current FTC in­
vestigations, including those, for example, concerning Sunkist and Ocean Spray. S. 
265, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
54. By comparison, other states have limited exemptions. Connecticut, for ex­
ample, exempts acts mandated by other Connecticut or federal laws. CONN. GEN.. 
STAT. ANN. 35-24 to -45 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Several states have taken the ap­
proach of excluding specific industries. New Jersey, for example, exempts utilities, 
insurance companies, banks, and security dealers. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. 56:9-5 
(West Cum. Supp. 1980). Massachusetts expands on both these approaches by 
excluding actions of any industry if approved by a state agency. 
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the statute. For example, chapter 93 would not reach joint rateset­
ting where permitted by state regulations. This holds true even if 
these regulations were proposed by the regulated industry, per­
functorily reviewed by the enforcing agency, and adopted without 
any consideration of their antitrust effects. 
Under present federal standards such pro forma approval 
would not exempt such conduct from Sherman Act scrutiny. The 
state action exemption first announced in Parker v. Brown55 has 
been severely restricted during the past five years. In Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona,56 the United States Supreme Court identi­
fied four factors which support a finding of state action immunity. 
Immunity will be found when there is a clearly defined state pol­
icy, formulation to advance valid state interests, implementation 
by state action compelling the questioned practice, and active su­
pervision by the state. State acquiescence alone is not sufficient. 57 
55. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a 
California raisin price maintenance program challenged as violative of the Com­
merce Clause and, at the Court's own urging, of the Sherman Act. While holding ex­
empt from the Sherman Act a state-mandated program for marketing agricultural 
products, the Supreme Court in Parker also commented that "a state does not give 
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or 
by declaring that their action is lawful ...." Id. at 351. 
56. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of 
state-action immunity in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980). After analyzing Parker and its progeny, Justice Powell, 
writing for the majority, wrote: 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker 
v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively 
supervised' by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light 
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978). 
Id. at 943. The opinion continues, outlining the factors which persuaded the 
Court to strike down California's statutory scheme for regulating wine prices: 
The California system for wine pricing satisfies the first standard. The 
legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit re­
sale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting 
and enforces the prices established by private parties. The State neither es­
tablishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor 
does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor 
market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program. 
The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting 
such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does not give immunity 
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by 
declaring that their action is lawful." 
Id. at 943-44 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)) (footnote omitted). 
57. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See also Fischer, Spuhl, 
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Moreover, this rule applies to actions of municipal subdivisions, 58 
as well as to state entities. Massachusetts courts may be expected 
to follow a similarly restrictive approach. This would serve to pro­
mote the legislative purpose of free and open competition in the 
interests of the general welfare and economy. 59 
F. Section 8: Investigations by the Attorney General 
Modeled on the Justice Department's Antitrust Civil Process 
Act,60 section 8 defines the attorney general's investigative pow­
ers. Prior to the commencement of any legal action, whenever the 
attorney general has "reasonable cause to believe"61 that a viola­
tion has been, is, or will be engaged in, he may issue compulsory 
process, such as civil investigative demands, to require document 
production, interrogatory answers, and oral testimony. Unlike the 
corresponding federal act, however, civil investigative demands can 
be served only on targets and not on third party witnesses. 62 The 
person served is entitled to petition the superior court for an ap­
propriate protective order. 
Documents obtained in the course of an investigation are to be 
kept confidential. In contrast with federal procedures,63 they are 
Herzwunn & Assoc., Inc. v. Forrest T. Jones & Co., 586 S.W.2d 310 (MD. Sup. Ct. 
1979). 
58. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
59. This would require narrowing § 7's sweeping language to immunize only 
those state-action activities actively regulated or legislatively mandated. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has narrowly construed chapter 93A's correspond­
ing provision. In a recent chapter 93A case, the court wrote: 
We reject the argument that an act Dr practice which is authorized by statute 
can never be an unfair or deceptive act Dr practice.... The fact that particu­
lar conduct is pennitted by statute or by common law principles should be 
considered, but it is not conclusive on the question of unfairness. 
Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 140, 142 
(1978). See also Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 49, 385 
N.E.2d 240 (1979), in which the court held that chapter 93A applied to a public util­
ity's unfair conduct even though it had been approved by a state regulatory agency. 
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976), as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti­
trust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976), which em­
powers federal officials to make pre-complaint demands for relevant materials. 
61. The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether federal courts have juris­
diction to determine if the FTC has complied with its statutory mandate that, prior to 
issuing a complaint, it "exercises the act of deciding" if it has the requisite "reason 
to believe" that there has been a violation of the FTC Act. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal., 596 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1077 (1980). 
62. A target's compliance with a civil investigative demand will not be excused 
on statutory exemption grounds. In re Application of Ajello V. Moffie, 944 ANTI­
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-l (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
63. Freedom of Infonnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). Standards for access to 
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not subject to disclosure under the Massachusetts Freedom of In­
formation Act64 except to government officials for antitrust enforce­
ment purposes only.65 When a case is closed, these documents are 
to be returned to the person who provided them. The effect of this 
protection is twofold. While encouraging voluntary compliance 
with civil investigative demands,66 these provisions correspond­
ingly discourage subsequent bootstrap litigation founded on infor­
mation contained in government acquired documents. 
While section 8 substantially increases the attorney general's 
investigative authority, it must be read in context with the Act's 
other provisions. 67 Considering chapter 93's major jurisdictional 
hurdles, the attorney general may elect to use chapter 93's inves­
tigative procedures but then file a complaint in United States Dis­
trict Court alleging federal antitrust violations. 68 By following this 
strategy, he utilizes the strengths of both the federal and state 
schemes. Moreover, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, he 
may incorporate in the federal complaint related chapter 93 and 
chapter 93A claims. 69 . 
grand jury testimony in a Justice Department action are discussed in Douglas Oil 
Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 221 (1979). 
64. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
65. The Attorney General may disclose "confidential" information to federal of­
ficials. These officials must give reasonable assurances that they will not release the 
documents to other persons. This limited exception furthers the strong policy fa­
voring state and. federal law enforcement cooperation. See; e.g., Martin Marietta 
Corp. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 338 (D. D.C. 1979) (holding that a state agency may have 
access to the transcript of a deposition taken by the FTC); Interco, Inc. v. FTC, 478 
F. Supp. 103 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the FTC may disclose to state attorneys 
general documents constituting trade secrets or customer lists); United States v. 
Campbell Hardware, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1979). Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act requires the U.S. Attorney General to notify state attorneys general of Justice 
Department actions which may warrant comparable state antitrust proceedings, and 
to share certain related files and materials with these state officers. The policy fa­
voring ongoing federal-state cooperation underlies chapter 93A's requirement that 
notice first be given to the FTC of certain proposed state actions. 
66. Targets are more likely to comply voluntarily with a civil investigative de­
mand request if third parties will not be afforded access to the produced documents. 
67. During the drafting stage, the Attorney General appeared to accept the 
Act's weaker sections (e.g., §§ 3 & 7) in exchange for passage of §§ 8 and 14. See text 
accompanying notes 17-23 supra. 
68. The Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976), may assist the At­
torney General during the discovery phase since it authorizes the federal courts to 
transfer cases involving common questions of fact or law to a single district for 
coordinated and consolidated pre-trial proceedings provided the transfer promotes 
the convenience of the parties and the just and efficient conduct of the proceedings. 
69. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S .. 715 (1966); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3566 (Supp. 1979). The 
Gibbs case outlined a two-step approach. First, the court must determine if it has the 
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C. Section 9: Parens Patriae Suits 
Modeled on the federal parens patriae act,70 section 9 author­
izes the attorney general to bring parens patriae suits for section 
4 violations.71 In these actions the attorney general may bring 
civil actions on behalf of the state's citizens who have been injured 
by the anticompetitive practice. Parens patriae suits are analogous 
to consumer class actions, in that each person may have sustained 
only minimal monetary damage but the aggregate amount may be 
quite substantial. Parens patriae suits, however, are not encum­
bered by the attendant procedural impediments of class action 
power to exercise pendent jurisdiction. It must find that: (1) There is a substantial 
federal claim; (2) the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of oper­
ative facts; and (3) the claims are the kind that a plaintiff would ordinarily be ex­
pected to try together. Having answered each affirmatively, the court then decides if 
it ought to exercise this power. 
In Kaminski v. Shawmut Credit Union, 416 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Mass. 1976), a fed­
eral Truth in Lending Act suit, the United States District Court accepted pendent ju­
risdiction over related chapter 93A claims. 
70. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976), as amended by Hart­
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 
(1976), authorizes state attorneys general to sue in federal court on behalf of state cit­
izens injured by Sherman Act violations. See H. Brown, Practice Comment, MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). See also Fein, supra note 5; Scher, 
supra note 5. 
This federal statute represents the Congressional response to two judicial rul­
ings. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), was an action brought by the 
state's Attorney General for injury to Hawaii's general economy. California v. Frito­
Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), similarly sought 
relief for the state's citizens. Both parens patriae actions were founded on common 
law principles. Both failed by not stating a proper cause of action. The courts inti­
mated that such a novel type of suit must rest on legislative authorization. Shortly 
thereafter, Congress amended the Clayton Act to provide this authority. 
71. In enacting the Parens Patriae Act, the Congressional objective was to de­
ter antitrust violations while providing a practical and effective remedy for persons 
injured by Sherman Act violations. Obtaining legal redress for these violations was 
often frustrated by evidentiary, procedural, and financial obstacles created by court 
decisions, especially those restricting consumer class actions. See Oppenheimer 
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (holding that, except in unusual circum­
stances, the burden of identifying, not hotifying, class members in a FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3) class action rests with the plaintiff); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 
720 (1977) (limiting price fixing standards to direct purchasers); Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (imposing stringent notice standards). But see Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), in which consumers were held to have stand­
ing as injury to their pocketbook satisfied the required statutory element of injury to 
"property." On remand, the District Court of Minnesota held that the consumer who 
purchased the price-fixed hearing aid could sue the manufacturer as well as the re­
tail seller as both were conspirators in the resale price maintenance scheme. Conse­
quently, the consumer was not an "indirect purchaser." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 
486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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suits.72 Individuals may elect to exclude themselves from the bene­
fits of this litigation, thereby preserving their right to file separate 
actions. Accordingly, final judgment will not have res judicata ef­
fect upon those individuals. 
The attorney general may sue for injuries to the Common­
wealth caused by violations of sections 4, 5, and 6. Actual damages 
may be trebled if malicious intent73 to injure the state is shown. In 
addition, the Act facilitates the calculation of damages. In price­
fixing cases it pennits damages to be proved and assessed in the 
aggregate by use of statistical or sampling methods. This eliminates 
the evidentiary obstacle of proving the identity and amount of in­
jury suffered by individual victims. Moneys recovered are distrib­
uted as determined by the court. Civil penalties of up to $25,000 
may also be sought by· the attorney general. Money recovered in 
this manner is deposited as a civil penalty in the Antitrust Enforce­
ment Fund. 74 
H. Section 10: Remedies 
As with the Sherman Act, chapter 93 provides for criminal 
sanctions. Violations are misdemeanors if they are knowing 
breaches of sections 4 or 5, and are engaged in with specific intent 
to injure any person. In a criminal antitrust action, therefore, the 
claimant may be required to establish defendant's state of mind or 
intent. 75 Once established, violations are remedied in two ways. 
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This avoids the manageability and evidentiary prob­
lems associated with proving injury to identifiable individuals. Often this require­
ment proved to be impractical, if not impossible. 
73. This standard would appear to seriously impair the Act's deterrent intent. 
74. To date, only a few parens patriae actions have been filed by state attorneys 
general in either state or federal courts. There are a number of reasons for this re­
straint. These include lack of clarification on the scope of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi­
nois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and constitutional issues concerning the act itself. To date, 
such constitutional challenges have been unsuccessful. See Fein, supra note 5. 
75. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Su­
preme Court held that in criminal price-fixing cases: 
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal anti­
trust offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn 
therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a le­
gal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.... We 
are unwilling to construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict li­
ability for criminal offenses. 
ld. at 435-36. This intent element may be satisfied by a showing that the conduct 
was undertaken with the specific purpose of producing anticompetitive effects or 
with knowledge of its probable consequences. The Gypsum rule should not affect 
the usual price-fixing case (e.g., agreements to fix price increases or bid rigging). See 
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First, fines of $100,000 for a corporation or $25,000 for individuals 
may be imposed. Second, jail sentences of one year may be or­
dered. 76 
I. Section 11: Effect ofJudgments 
Section 11 provides that a final judgment in an action brought 
by the attorney general may be used as prima facie evidence in 
subsequent third party actions against the same defendant, pro­
vided the issues are the same. This mirrors the rule employed in 
federal antitrust actions. 
Litigants also may introduce final judgments for offensive as 
well as defensive collateral estoppel purposes. This is permitted 
when there is no mutuality of parties, provided the opposing party 
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims. Therefore, 
rather than creating a mere presumption in one's favor, this proce­
dure precludes relitigation of the same issues. 77 
J. Section 12: Private Right of Action 
Section 12 is the key provision for private claimants. Modelled 
on section 4 of the Clayton Act, it authorizes "[a]ny person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of a violation 
United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 727, 
728 (1980); United States v. Society of Independent Gasoline Mktrs., 945 ANTITRUST 
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-17 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton Bldg. 
& Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 79, 80 
(1980). For a discussion of the Justice Department's criteria in selecting antitrust 
cases for criminal prosecution see Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Pmsecutorial 
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1978). In addition, 
some states have enacted novel remedy provisions. For example, New Jersey pro­
vides for discretionary charter revocation and precludes a convicted individual from 
owning or managing a business. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:9-7, 59:9-11(b) (1971). 
76. In comparison, a Sherman Act violation is a felony. In addition to a jail sen­
tence of up to three years, fines may be imposed of $1,000,000 for corporations and 
$100,000 for individuals. The Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974, § 3, Pub. 
L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (amending 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). 
77. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the United States Su­
preme Court endorsed the offensive use of collateral estoppel. This means that in a 
subsequent action the defendant may be estopped from relitigating the same issues 
raised in the prior suit if there had been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
matters, even though mutuality of parties is not present. The California Supreme 
Court declined to review a decision, R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 94 Cal. 
App. 3d 419, 156 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1024 (1980), that ap­
plied offensive collateral estoppel to prior rulings by a state court and a federal 
administrative agency, the FTC. Congress has recently enacted a law, Pub. L. No. 
93-349, to assure that collateral estoppel may be applied in antitrust litigation, except 
as to administrative agency decisions. 
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of the provisions of this chapter" to bring a suit for actual damages 
plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 78 
There is a considerable body of federal law interpreting this 
specific language. To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy each el­
ement, namely that (1) he is a "person"79 (2) who has suffered anti­
trust type injury80 (3) to his business or property81 (4) which was 
proximately caused (5) by the illegal anticompetitive act. Once lia­
bility has been established, the claimant must prove the fact of 
damage or impact. 82 There is greater flexibility in proving the 
amount of damages flowing from the antitrust injury than in prov­
ing that one was injured by the anticompetitive act. While mere 
speculation or guesswork is not permitted, "a just and reasonable 
estimate of the damages based on relevant data" will be allowed. 83 
Despite the lack of impediments to proving actual damages, 
chapter 93 appears to discourage ancillary remedies such as treble 
damages and attorneys' fees. If claimant establishes malicious in­
tent, treble damages may be awarded as well as costs and reason­
able attorneys' fees. 84 By comparison, the federal antitrust laws man­
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The judiciary has recognized private antitrust suits to 
be the "bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International 
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,139 (1968). They represent about 95% of all antitru.st cases. 
A report based on litigation in the Southern District of New York, recently issued by 
the ABA, indicates that the typical private antitrust case involves vertical market rela­
tionships, concerns financially smaller comp;lnies which are suing larger defendants, 
will be dismissed or settled voluntarily 80% of the time, and lasts an average of 19 
months. The "primary practices violations" found were, first, vertical dealer termina­
tions or boycotts; second, major vertical price fixing and market allocation; and third, 
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements. REPORT OF ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, 946 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at A-I (Jan. 10, 1980). 
79. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
80. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
81. See note 71 supra. 
82. There are essentially three different types of damages that a plaintiff may es­
tablish: (1) Lost profits; (2) actual losses; and (3) goodwill or going concern value. 
Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st CiT. 1969). 
83. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parch­
ment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). 
84. In a chapter 93A § 11 case, a successful plaintiff normally should recover 
reasonable expert witness fees in addition to other costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees. Moreover, in determining the amount to be awarded for reasonable attorneys' 
fees, the court should consider "the nature of the case and the issues presented, the 
time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the 
experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for sim­
ilar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in 
similar cases." Linthicum v. Archambault, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2661, 398 N.E.2d 482 
(1979). See also Judge Freedman's opinion in HEW Corp. v. Tandy Corp., 480 F. 
Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1979). But see Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 
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date automatic trebling. 85 
Injunctive relief may also be obtained,86 although there is no 
corresponding authorization for attorneys' fees. In contrast, a recent 
amendment to the Clayton Act authorized the award of attorneys' 
fees in federal actions. 87 
Procedurally, a parens patriae action stays a private suit 
brought under this chapter or chapter 93A if it involves the same 
defendant and at least some of the same issues. Jurisdiction lies in 
superior court and as a pendent claim in federal district court. 
Venue lies in the county where the defendant resides or has its 
principal place of business, or the county where the violation 
occurred. 
Unlike chapter 93A, there is no section liberalizing class action 
requirements. Antitrust class action complaints, therefore, must 
satisfy the stringent demands of rule 23 of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 88 Since rule 23 mirrors the federal class action rule, 
antitrust class actions under chapter 93 are likely to encounter the 
same manageability, notice, and common question impediments ex­
perienced by antitrust class actions89 initiated under the federal rule. 
322 N.E.2d 768, 777 n.16 (1975), in which the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that 
in its view the Massachusetts version of FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) "seems to permit the 
flexibility in notification of class members which, before the Eisen case [417 U.S. 
156 (1974)] was decided, many commentators had urged be allowed under the fed­
eral rule." 
85. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. In­
ternational Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
86. Section 16 imposes a lower threshold of standing than § 4 since the plaintiff 
need only show threatened loss or damage rather than injury to business or property. 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). Injunctive relief is authorized by 
the Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). In general, the federal courts have avail­
able a broad range of equitable remedies. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 171 (1948); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 
(1904). 
87. 14 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve­
ment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). Responding to the Su­
preme Court's ruling that attorneys' fees cannot be awarded unless specifically au­
thorized by statute, Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975), Congress amended the Clayton Act to allow attorneys' fees in injunction ac­
tions. Interpreting this amendment as a procedural change, the courts have applied it 
retroactively. Alphin V. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 
(1977). Attorneys' fees in an antitrust suit for preliminary injunctive relief were re­
cently awarded in F. & M. Schaefer Corp. V. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 
203 (S.D.N.Y.), aIi'd, 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979). 
88. MASS. R. CIV. P. RULE 23(a). 
89. Bernstein & Berger, Recent Developments in Private Antitrust Class Ac­
tions, 24 N.Y. L. REV. 819 (1979). 
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K. Section 13: Statute of Limitations 
Conforming to federal antitrust laws and chapter 93A,90 the 
statute of limitations91 is four years from the time the cause of ac­
tion accrued. 92 In harmony with federal precedents, Massachusetts 
courts are likely to construe continuing violations as accruing at the 
time of the most recent illegal act. 93 As a result of this provision, 
in appropriate factual situations a private plaintiff may recover 
treble damages for the past four years. This multiplying effect can 
be quite substantial. For example, if criminal damages equal 
$10,000, the dollar recovery, if trebled, may be as much as 
$120,000, exclusive of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
The running of this statute is suspended during the pendency 
of an action by the state and for one year thereafter. The toll, how­
ever, apparently is restricted to four years. 
L. Section 14: Antitrust Enforcement Fund 
Section 14 establishes an "Antitrust Enforcement Fund." De­
posited in this Fund is money received by the state as a result of 
the attorney general's antitrust enforcement efforts. It is to be 
used solely to finance similar future litigation. A maximum deposi­
tory of one million dollars is established, with any excess to benefit 
the general fund. 
The creation of this Fund assures that, despite the vicissitudes 
90. The federal four-year statute of limitations has been held not to preempt the 
state from enacting a longer statute of limitations and damage period. Ohio ex rel. 
Brown v. Klosterman French Baking Co., [1977-1) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 61,361 at 
71,271 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
91. The two main purposes of a statute of limitations are to assure fairness to the 
party sued by putting him on notice and to relieve courts of the burden of trying 
state claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. Burnett v. New York Cent. RR. 
Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
92. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 5A (West Cum. 
Supp. 1980). 
93. Mindful of the remedial and deterrent purpose of private antitrust enforce­
ment, the federal courts have taken a pragmatic approach to statute of limitation is­
sues. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322 (1978). For example, it 
is tolled by fraudulent concealment. Also, when there is a continuing violation the 
cause of action accrues when an anticompetitive act injures the plaintiff, even though 
there may be later injuries resulting from the same act. In most types of civil cases, 
Massachusetts courts have been less permissive. For example, in a medical malprac­
tice action the two-year statute of limitation was held to run from the time the physi­
cian left the surgical instrument in the patient rather than when it was discovered. 
Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966). 
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of politics, the attorney general will have adequate resources to 
pursue "big" cases, plan long-term policies, initiate major projects, 
and develop a staff of antitrust specialists. 
While providing these and other enumerated benefits, the 
Fund nevertheless may present a conflict of interest. At some point 
the attorney general may be faced with a choice between ac­
cepting a settlement that substantially replenishes this bank ac­
count or pursuing a judicially determined result. 
M. Section 14A: Relation to Chapter 93A 
Section 14A states that chapter 93 affects chapter 93A only to 
the extent explicitly provided in that statute. As previously dis­
cussed, this interdependent relationship is the result of a major 
compromise reached by business and consumer groups. Its legal 
consequences are significant. Chapter 93A is broader in its scope 
than chapter 93. It not only reaches full-fledged anticompetitive 
conduct, but also conduct which violates the spirit, if not the tech­
nical letter, of the antitrust laws. 94 A claimant, therefore, may suc­
cessfully litigate a chapter 93A unfair method of competition claim 
while at the same time fail to prove a chapter 93 claim. Since nei­
ther statute has been definitively interpreted, claimants at present 
may elect to sue for violations of both in one action. 95 
N . Notable Omissions 
Chapter 93 does not address two subjects which have been the 
focus of considerable federal antitrust activity: Price discrimination 
and mergers. The Federal Robinson-Patman Act proscribes dis­
criminatory pricing practices between different purchasers of com­
modities of like grade, quality, and quantity where competition is 
lessened. 96 Mergers which substantially lessen competition are pro­
94. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 324 (1966); Atlantic Refining Co. v. 
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965). 
95. The Attorney General has followed this procedure. See In re Levi Strauss & 
Co., 901 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-1 (Suffolk Super. Ct. 1979). 
96. The Clayton Act § 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 
§ 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). This statute has recently been described as "a 
cOinpromise between conflicting, perhaps irreconcilable, policy objectives, the main­
tenance of price competition for the benefit of the consumer and protection of 
smaller business firms from competition. Subsequent uncertain and inconsistent in­
terpretations of almost every provision of the Act have reflected its schizoid origins." 
Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 471 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). Several af­
firmative defenses may be raised, such as meeting competition or cost justification. 
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hibited by section 7 of the Clayton Act. 97 Both practices may also 
violate section 5 of the FTC Act. 98 
The legislative history indicates that the substantial omissions 
in chapter 93 are intentional. The business community opposed the 
inclusion of analogous provisions in chapter 93. The attorney gen­
eral also did not support their addition. His position was founded 
on the belief, propounded by many economists, that price dis­
crimination is procompetitive and that merger prosecution is too 
complex and expensive an undertaking for a fledgling enforcement 
division. Other states have not reached the same conclusions. 99 
Nevertheless, despite being omitted from chapter 93, price dis­
crimination and anticompetitive mergers may be challenged as "un­
fair methods of competition" in violation of chapter 93A.100 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The past decade has witnessed the revival of state interest in 
antitrust enforcement. Spurred by consumer support, federal finan-
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Great At!. & 
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 
(1974); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (horizontal mer­
gers); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (vertical mergers); 
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) and United States v. 
Penn-Olin Chern. Co., 278 U.S. 158 (1964) (conglomerate mergers). These suits gen­
erally involve complex analyses defining the relevant geographic and market lines. 
98. See Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473 (1965), modified by consent, [1967] 
TRADE CAS. (CCH) ~ 72,124 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) 
(holding a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act to be a violaion of § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act). Pursuant to Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti­
trust Improvements Act of 1976, the FTC has issued premerger notification regula­
tions, 16 C.F.R. § 800.1-.9 (1980). These apply to a ·wide variety of merger transac­
tions and are designed to give the FTC and Justice Department adequate lead time 
to examine the proposed merger's anticompetitive effect. 
Section 5 has been construed to reach practices violating the spirit if not the let­
ter of the Robinson-Patman Act. R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 
1964), modifying and aff'g, 60 F.T.C. 1249 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 
F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962), modifying and aff'g, 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960). 
99. A number of states have not only enacted these provisions but have also 
filed suits to enforce them. Recently California settled a pioneering state anti-merger 
complaint. The defendant bowling alley operator agreed to divest itself of an ac­
quired bowling alley and pay a $2,500 civil penalty. California v. Timberlanes of 
Redding, Inc., 938 AI\'TITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), at D-l (Cal. S. Ct. 1979). 
For a summary of state merger actions see [1979] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 4460, 
at 6873. 
100. As such practices violate § 5 of the FTC Act, they also may be held to vio­
late Massachusetts' corresponding "little" FTC Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A 
(West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
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cial assistance, and strengthened legislation, the states have in­
creasingly pursued an active and at times innovative role as anti­
trust prosecutors. 
Massachusetts has joined this movement. By enacting chapter 93 
the Commonwealth expressed its commitment to protect free and 
unfettered competition in the business community. New procedur­
al devices, rights, and remedies were created to assist this effort. De­
spite these improvements chapter 93 remains less than satisfactory 
as an antitrust tool. Substantial revisions are necessary if this Act is 
to serve as a meaningful deterrent to violators of the antitrust laws. 
The future portends continued if not increased state effort in 
this area. Increased state activity means increased involvement by 
lawyers representing local as well as national businesses. Antitrust 
counseling, therefore, is likely to become a common adjunct to cor­
porate lawyering. 
It remains to be seen, however, to what extent chapter 93, as 
presently drafted, will be used offensively as a source of rights for 
business and consumer plaintiffs. The Act imposes serious proce­
dural hurdles that add significantly to an already high threshold for 
bringing complex antitrust litigation. 
Chapter 93's provisions also appear to favor large national 
companies, the most likely defendants in antitrust litigation. Not 
only are the Act's jurisdictional and exemption sections unneces­
sarily cumbrous, they also are drafted t~ favor large defendants. 
The Act's definition section furthers this effect by excluding entire 
categories of commercial conduct. Section 8' s confidentiality pro­
tections remove a common means for private plaintiffs to acquire 
evidence of wrongdoing by much larger companies. Without such 
access they may be required to pursue lengthy, protracted, and 
often futile discovery efforts. Clearly, large national companies are 
more financially prepared to win this war of procedural procrastina­
tion. Substantively, the Act excludes anticompetitive mergers and 
price discrimination; both types of conduct are more likely to be 
engaged in by big business. Furthermore, the injured parties in 
. such actions are usually much smaller enterprises. Thus procedural 
and substantive impediments may deter plaintiffs with valid actions 
from bringing their claims and thus reinforce improper business ac­
tivities. 
Damages, the key to successful private antitrust enforcement, 
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is another area where litigation difficulties may arise. Unlike the 
federal antitrust laws, which automatically treble a successful plain­
tiffs injuries, the Massachusetts Antitrust Act provides only for 
recovery of actual damages. A plaintiff must prove the subjective 
and slippery element of malicious intent to be awarded more than 
single damages. Because the Act is a criminal statute, this mens 
rea type burden is likely to be considerable. The incentive to bring 
an antitrust suit is further diminished by the Act's failure to autho­
rize the granting of reasonable attorneys' fees in injunction actions. 
Since many small business antitrust suits are brought pursuant to 
a contingent fee arrangement, this failure may chill the willing­
ness of counsel to represent distributors, franchisees, and other 
small companies faced, for example, with termination. As has been 
noted, the federal antitrust laws were amended to rectify this un­
warranted exclusion. Chapter 93 further discourages private suits 
by consumers and small businesses against large companies by its 
lack of a class action section comparable to the provision in chap­
ter 93A. 
All these factors militate against private enforcement efforts. 
The major issue thus becomes what, if any, benefits chapter 93 of­
fers to injured plaintiffs. The answer to this query is far from 
clear. It may be speculated that chapter 93 may result in the re­
covery of supplemental damages when incorPorated as a pendent 
action in a federal antitrust suit. When joined with chapter 93A in 
a state action, it may also afford a greater degree of certainty of the 
potential outcome as there is considerable judicial case law defining 
illegal conduct under the federal antitrust laws. 
As in most federal private antitrust actions, chapter 93 cases 
are likely to involve issues of price fixing, group boycotts, and 
other per se violations. Cases alleging per se conduct are much 
more appealing to the plaintiff antitrust practitioner than cases 
challenging conduct that is subject to analysis under the rule of 
reason. The former can be short and lucrative for plaintiff's attor­
ney while the latter envisions extensive discovery and trial with at­
tendant doubtful results. 
As in the federal area, private antitrust suits may be expected 
to follow in the wake of successful government actions. The Act's 
provision that rulings in such government actions may be offered as 
prima facie evidence of misconduct considerably reduces the bur­
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den on private plaintiffs in subsequent litigation against the same 
defendant. Offensive collateral estoppel offers even greater proce­
dural benefits. 
The Massachusetts Antitrust Act could be strengthened sig­
nificantly by legislative redrafting. Sections 3 and 7 should be 
rewritten to eliminate the Act's evident and unjustified loopholes. 
They presently allow companies engaged in anticompetitive con­
duct to escape the statute's prohibitions, thereby contravening the 
Act's intent. Section 3 might be drafted to reach all violations 
which have significant local consequences. Section 7 might immu­
nize only anticompetitive conduct mandated by and actively super­
vised by a federal or state agency, or preempted or in conflict with 
federal law. The remedies section should also be strengthened. 101 
Damages should be trebled in a mandatory fashion. Violations 
should be made felonies. Consideration should also be given to 
other more innovative penalties such as corporate charter revoca­
tion. 102 Other procedural and substantive provisions should be 
added to permit prosecution of anticompetitive mergers, suits by 
indirect purchasers, and class action relief. 103 
The concept of federalism encourages each state to grapple 
with national problems and to develop its own innovative solutions. 
A number of states have responded to this opportunity by enacting 
strong, comprehensive antitrust laws. Massachusetts has long been 
in the forefront of the movement to enact public interest legisla­
tion. It should resume this leadership position by adopting a 
sound, fair, and effective state antitrust law. The increasing eco­
nomic pressures on business likely to prevail during the 1980's will 
require a strong state and private effort to protect Massachusetts 
citizens from the evils of anticompetitive business conduct. Since 
101. The state may enact different and stronger remedy provisions without cre­
ating an unconstitutional conflict with federal law. See Connecticut v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 471 F. Supp. 363 (D. Conn. 1979). 
102. These remedies might include permanently barring a company from doing 
business in the state, Texas v. The Scott & Fetzer Co., 933 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP. (BNA), at D-5 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1979), or requiring restitution to consumers 
injured by price-fixing, Colorado v. Torbuc Corp., 941 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA), at D-l (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1979). 
103. See The Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (Deering 
1976), as amended by Stats. 1978, ch. 536, § 1. See also California & Hawaiian Sugar 
Co. v. California, 588 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979), in 
which the Ninth Circuit held that although no claim under federal law existed after 
application of Illinois Brick, there may still be a claim under California law. 
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chapter 93 does not presently contain the legal weapons,104 the 
legislature should promptly act by amending the statute to incorpo­
rate these legal tools. 
104. As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in California Retail Liquor Deal­
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980): "Antitrust laws in general, 
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are 
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system 
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." Id. 
at 946 (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). 
